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## VIETNAM: LEAKS FROM ANONYMOUS OFFICIAL SOURCES

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, stories attributed to unnamed "U.S. officials" have been appearing in the press, to the effect that the war in Vietnam does not necessarily have to end in a negotiated settlement. The unnamed officials want to be sure, apparently, that the public understands that there is an alternative to negotiations. What these officials suggest, as the alternative, amounts to a total military solution, with the Vietcong being driven into a state of nonexistence.

This thesis is valid as a basis for college discussion. It is valid as a subject for consideration in the classified recesses of the Executive branch of the Government. It is not valid, however, as a "leak" from anonymous official sources, leaving the strong impression that the policy of seeking negotiations is all but abandoned and we are about to adopt a new one. Indeed, one newspaper carried a banner headline on the basis of this leak: "U.S. Now Sees Vietnam Victory by Force of Arms." The impression left by the story is clear: It is that the doctrine of "unconditional negotiations" is about to be replaced by the doctrine of unconditional triumph as official policy. Whether that is accurate or not, is beside the point. Whether it is a practical possibility is beside the point.

The point is that official United States policy on Vietnam, as enunciated time and again by the President, is and remains one of seeking an honorable negotiated end to the conflict as quickly as possible. The President's policy—and it is the only official policy of this Government—is not to prove the theoretical possibility that a war of attrition without negotiation can end in a triumph in 1, 5, 10, or 15 years.

The point is, too, that it is not college students or professors without responsibility for official policy who are advancing this concept; it is not the press or political leaders out of office and without official responsibilities; it is not the Representatives or Senators, who have independent constitutional responsibilities, who are discussing this alternative policy. Rather, it is anonymous "U.S. officials" who can have no responsibilities except official responsibilities in these matters; it is U.S. officials who are not privileged to speak on policy outside of the walls of the Executive branch except as they express the official policy of the United States as enunciated by the President and under his direction, and with his approval. For them to speak otherwise, even anonymously, is to imply strongly that the President of the United States so thinks.

Now, it is true that these official sources were at pains to make it clear that they support the President's policy of seeking an end to the Vietnamese conflict by negotiations, even as they advance an alternative approach of a solution by attrition. Well, if they are supporting the President's policy, why do they insist upon remaining unnamed? Why, then, do they hesitate to attach their names to that which they are discussing with the press?

Indeed, who are these official but unnamed sources? As one Senator, I would like to know in order to estimate the significance of the story, in order to know what to tell my constituents when they inquire as to the Nation's policies respecting Vietnam. Are these officials in the White House? Are they in the Defense Department? The State Department? The CIA? Or are they scattered throughout the executive branch? Is it the head of a department who advances this new concept of Vietnamese policy? Or is it a chairwarmer at a southeast Asia desk somewhere or a guard at the front door of the Pentagon or the State Department?

Whoever they may be, one thing is certain about these unnamed official sources. They are most irresponsible sources, in a situation in which the utmost of responsibility is vital, and I use the word vital, rarely and most advisedly. Here, we have almost 150,000 men in Vietnam; the number is going up steadily and the end is not yet in sight. The President has made it clear, not once but a dozen times, that he seeks an end to the Vietnamese conflict through negotiations, and that negotiations as soon as possible are in the interest of this Nation and of all concerned. That is his policy; that is U.S. official policy—period.

In these circumstances, for an unnamed official source to engage in an idle discussion—if that is what it was—of an alternative policy of triumph by attrition, is, to say the least, a breach of trust. With the President in the hospital it is, indeed, an inexcusable breach of trust.

So I would say to these anonymous officials: You are appointed officials of this Government. Your function is not to speculate to the press on the President's policy. Much less is it your function to advance publicly alternatives to his policies, even under the anonymous cloak of "official sources." Your function is to advise the President and carry out, in good faith, foreign policies which he makes in accord with constitutional processes. Any other course, particularly in the critical Vietnamese situation, is an invitation to a lengthening of the casualty lists, to the most serious difficulties and division at home and to disaster in our relations with the rest of the world.

That ought to be understood without the saying by every appointed official of the Government. The recent rash of anonymous official speculation on Vietnam, however, makes it clear that it needs to be said.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, nine excerpts from the President's statement to the press on July 28, 1965, articles and editorials on this subject.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Second, once the Communists know, as we know, that a violent solution is impossible, then a peaceful solution is inevitable. We are ready now, as we have always been, to move from the battlefield to the conference table.

I have stated publicly and many times, again and again, America's willingness to begin unconditional discussions with any Gov-

ernment at any place at any time.

Fifteen efforts have been made to start these discussions, with the help of 40 nations throughout the world. But there has been no answer. But we are going to continue to persist, if persist we must, until death and desolation have led to the same conference table where others could now join us at a much smaller cost.

I have spoken many times of our objectives in Vietnam. So has the Government of South Vietnam. Hanoi has set forth its own proposals. We are ready to discuss their proposals and our proposals and any proposals of any Government whose people may be affected, for we fear the meeting room no more than we fear the battlefield. And in this pursuit we welcome, and we ask for the concern and the assistance of any nation and all nations.

And if the United Nations and its officials or any one of its 114 members can by deed or word, private initiative or public action, bring us nearer an honorable peace, then they will have the support and gratitude of the United States of America.

I've directed Ambassador Goldberg to go to New York today and to present immediately to Secretary General U Thant a letter from me requesting that all the resources and the energy and the immense prestige of the United Nations be employed to find ways to halt aggression and to bring peace in Vietnam.

But we insist and we will always insist that the people of South Vietnam shall have the right of choice, the right to shape their own destiny in free elections in the South or throughout all Vietnam under international supervision, and they shall not have any Government imposed upon them by force and terror so long as we can prevent it.

As I just said, I hope that every member of the United Nations that has any idea or any plan, any program, any suggestion, that they will not let them go unexplored.

And as I have said so many times, if anyone questions our good faith and will ask us to meet them to try to reason this matter out, they will find us at the appointed place, the appointed time and the proper chair.

A. I have made very clear in my San Francisco speech my hope that the Secretary General under his wise leadership would explore every possibility that might lead to a solution of this matter. In my letter to the Secretary General this morning which Ambassador Goldberg will deliver later in the day, I reiterate my hopes and my desires and I urge upon him that he—if he agrees—that he undertake new efforts in this direction.

Ambassador Goldberg understands the challenge. We spent the weekend talking about the potentialities and the possibilities, our hopes and our dreams, and I believe that we will have an able advocate and a searching negotiator who, I would hope, could someday find success.

A. We have stated time and time again that we would negotiate with any Government, any time, any place. The Vietcong would have no difficulty in being represented and having their views presented if Hanoi

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for a moment decides that she wants to cease aggression, and I would not think that would be an insurmountable obstacle. I think that could be worked out.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Oct. 17, 1965]

**STRATEGY CHANGE IN VIETNAM—BELIEF GROWING THAT LARGE-SCALE U.S. EFFORT MAY SUCCEED SOON**

(By Richard Dudman)

WASHINGTON, October 16.—The outlines of a new strategy in Vietnam are emerging as the influx of massive American military strength begins to take effect.

In its simplest terms, the new strategy calls for the use of large amounts of American men and guns to win a military victory in the south.

Some spectacular successes have changed the official atmosphere from the pessimism of 6 months ago, when the American effort faced imminent military defeat, to a growing conviction that the back of the insurgency can be broken in the foreseeable future, possibly within months.

Even the failures have helped promote the emerging strategy. The lesson many planners drew this week, when 2,000 Vietcong slipped out of a trap sprung by combined American and South Vietnamese forces, was: Secrecy is better kept when the Americans go it alone.

The successes have strengthened the position of the so-called war hawks—those who never had much use for "special warfare" and counterinsurgency techniques, who wanted to bomb North-Vietnam or even China years ago, who have regretted President Lyndon B. Johnson's offers to negotiate, and who believe that peace talks now would lead to a neutralist South Vietnam instead of the anti-Communist bastion they see as a possibility.

The "relatively benign policy of counterinsurgency" must be put aside for the time being, in the words of a policy paper being circulated at high levels in the administration.

As reliance on armed force increases, less is heard about the winning of the hearts and minds of the population.

Officials no longer are reluctant to talk about American use of napalm, tear gas, and crop-destroying aerial sprays. Six months ago, if they were discussed at all it was to emphasize how little they were being used.

Despite efforts to avoid injuring civilians in the fight against the Vietcong, women and children and old men are inevitably among the victims of a war fought increasingly with heavy bombs and artillery.

A new defense of this strategy is being heard in Washington. Critics are being assured that surveys of civilian populations subjected to air attacks show that they blame the war in general for their suffering rather than the particular nation that is doing this bombing.

One student of civilian behavior, arguing in support of the enlarged war in Vietnam, contends that the rape of a single Vietnamese woman by an American soldier causes far more resentment against the United States than does the destruction of an entire village.

Less is heard, too, about a negotiated settlement. When the outlook was black, the administration was nagging potential go-betweens in Communist and neutralist countries to try to persuade North Vietnam to come to the conference table.

Now that the military situation appears brighter, officials are emphasizing that negotiation with the Communists is not the only likely solution.

Officials pointed out this week that the problem could also be solved by an unannounced slowing down of North Vietnamese assistance and Vietcong activity in the south.

The outcome thus need not follow the pattern of the Indochina war or the Algerian revolution, with their formal peace talks between the insurgents and the French. Instead, it could follow the examples of Greece and the Philippines after World War II, when both nations successfully resisted Communist-led insurgencies.

In Greece, the officials pointed out, the Communists simply were worn down and eventually caused to retreat into North Vietnam.

President Johnson has by no means bought the entire hard line. He has not accepted the formula attributed to the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William F. Raborn, Jr.—"a Rotterdam policy in the north and a Dominican policy in the south." Raborn is said to have explained that this meant saturation bombing of Hanoi and sending into South Vietnam five times as many troops as seemed necessary.

Bombers attacking the north have kept clear of the Hanoi area, where there would be a chance of direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union. Russian-built missiles, which are concentrated around the North Vietnamese capital, have shot down five American planes in the last 4 months.

The American troop buildup has reached 145,000 and is expected to reach 200,000 eventually. Some military leaders speak of a million-man American force, but others scoff at that figure. American troops in the Korean war numbered about 250,000.

A measure of the buildup is the weekly casualty figure. Fifty-eight Americans were killed in action in Vietnam last week. Total American casualties rose to 806 hostile deaths, 309 nonhostile deaths, 4,259 wounded in action, 76 missing in action, and 21 detained by the enemy.

Strategists generally avoid the term "victory," although in recent weeks that is clearly what some of them have had in mind.

They base their present optimism on the apparent ability of the increased manpower and firepower to defeat the Vietcong any time the Reds stand still for a fight in regimental or division strength. The war had been going in the direction of big-unit engagements, and the South Vietnamese Army was in serious trouble until bolstered by American combat troops.

The immediate task, therefore, is to pound and kill and harry the Vietcong's main force until it gives up or, more likely, breaks up into small guerrilla bands to continue the fighting without affording a good target.

Once the Vietcong have been forced to return to guerrilla warfare, it is thought here, the insurgency will be close to defeat. The shift will mean breaking up elaborate supply lines for weapons and supplies, going back to using homemade or captured American arms, and, worst of all, admitting to the Vietcong rank-and-file that there will not be a quick victory after all.

The strategy paper mentioned earlier says that there are three possible outcomes from the American point of view—defeat, a stalemate, or victory. It says that a stalemate would be the hardest to achieve. The implication is that victory should be the goal.

One policymaker who holds that view makes the further point that victory is possible once the United States has forced the Vietcong to return to guerrilla warfare.

He reasons that guerrilla wars invariably are won or lost, that they never end in a draw. A ceasefire would mean that the Vietcong would promptly lose all the gray areas, the territory where it can operate but cannot make a permanent stand. The reason, he says, is that the Vietnamese Army would use a ceasefire to clean out any guerrillas remaining in such areas.

Those who see the new strategy in these terms contend that progress cannot be measured merely in enemy casualties. They call an operation a success even if it results in few Vietcong bodies, because the objective is not so much to kill the enemy as to harass him and prove to him that his war is unprofitable.

They insist also that the bombing of North Vietnam is hurting the Hanoi regime seriously and must be continued with no letup.

This analysis rests on some broad assumptions, which may or may not stand up.

It assumes that the Vietcong lack the resiliency to return to guerrilla warfare and go on effectively with the kind of fighting that took the British 10 years to suppress in Malaya.

It assumes also that American power—planes crisscrossing the country and bombs falling in hiding places—can make a country almost as big as Missouri an impossible place to operate.

On the political side, it assumes that the government of Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky, the chief of the Vietnamese air force, represents a new breed of leaders, able at last to inspire the people with a revolutionary spirit that will unify them in the fight.

Finally, this analysis assumes that favorable results will come very soon. President Johnson would find it embarrassing to go to the country seeking reelection in 1968 with a stalemated war still on his hands, and the ever-larger conflict could well be an issue in the congressional elections next year.

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